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Abstract. We study the logical complexity of proofs in cyclic arithmetic (CA), as intro-
duced by Simpson in [Sim17], in terms of quantifier alternations of formulae occurring.
Writing CΣn for (the logical consequences of) cyclic proofs containing only Σn formulae,
our main result is that IΣn+1 and CΣn prove the same Πn+1 theorems, for n ≥ 0. Further-
more, due to the ‘uniformity’ of our method, we also show that CA and Peano Arithmetic
(PA) proofs of the same theorem differ only exponentially in size.
The inclusion IΣn+1 ⊆ CΣn is obtained by proof theoretic techniques, relying on normal
forms and structural manipulations of PA proofs. It improves upon the natural result that
IΣn ⊆ CΣn. The converse inclusion, CΣn ⊆ IΣn+1, is obtained by calibrating the approach
of [Sim17] with recent results on the reverse mathematics of Bu¨chi’s theorem [KMPM16],
and specialising to the case of cyclic proofs. These results improve upon the bounds on
proof complexity and logical complexity implicit in [Sim17] and [BT17b].
The uniformity of our method also allows us to recover a metamathematical account of
fragments of CA; in particular we show that, for n ≥ 0, the consistency of CΣn is provable
in IΣn+2 but not IΣn+1.
1. Introduction
Cyclic and non-wellfounded proofs have been studied by a number of authors as an alter-
native to proofs by induction. This includes cyclic systems for fragments of the modal
µ-calculus, e.g. [NW96, SD03, DHL06, DBHS16, Dou17, AL17], structural proof theory
for logics with fixed-points, e.g. [San02, FS13, For14, BDS16], (automated) proofs of pro-
gram termination in separation logic, e.g. [BBC08, BDP11, RB17] and, in particular, cyclic
systems for first-order logic with inductive definitions, e.g. [Bro05, Bro06, BS07, BS11].
Due to the somewhat implicit nature of invariants they define, cyclic systems can be
advantageous for metalogical analysis, for instance offering better algorithms for proof
search, e.g. [BGP12, DP17].
Cyclic proofs may be seen as more intuitively analogous to proofs by ‘infinite descent’
than proofs by induction (see, e.g., [Sim17]); this subtle difference is enough to make induc-
tive invariants rather hard to generate from cyclic proofs. Indeed it was recently shown that
simulating cyclic proofs using induction is not possible for some sub-arithmetic languages
[BT17a], but becomes possible once arithmetic reasoning is available [Sim17, BT17b].
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Cyclic arithmetic was proposed as a general subject of study by Simpson in [Sim17].
Working in the language of arithmetic, it replaces induction by non-wellfounded proofs with
a certain ‘fairness’ condition on the infinite branches. The advantage of this approach to
infinite proof theory as opposed to, say, infinite well-founded proofs via an ω-rule (see, e.g.,
[Sch77]), is that it admits a notion of finite proofs: those that have only finitely many
distinct subproofs, and so may be represented by a finite (possibly cyclic) graph.
Cyclic arithmetic itself is to cyclic proofs what Peano arithmetic is to traditional proofs:
it provides a general framework in which many arguments can be interpreted and/or proved
in a uniform manner, and this is one reason why it is an interesting subject of study. This
is already clear from, say, the results of [BT17b], where the study of cyclic proofs for first-
order logic with inductive definitions relied on an underlying arithmetic framework. We
elaborate further on this in Sect. 10.
Contribution. In [Sim17], Simpson shows that Peano Arithmetic (PA) (i.e. with induction)
is able to simulate cyclic reasoning by proving the soundness of the latter in the former.
(The converse result is obtained much more easily.) Nonetheless, several open questions
remain from [Sim17], concerning constructivity, normalisation, logical complexity and proof
complexity for cyclic and non-wellfounded proofs.
In this work we address the logical complexity and proof complexity of proofs in Cyclic
Arithmetic (CA), as compared to PA. Namely, we study how quantifier alternation of proofs
in one system compares to that in the other, and furthermore how the size of proofs compare.
Writing CΣn for (the logical consequences of) cyclic proofs containing only Σn formulae, we
show, for n ≥ 0:
(1) IΣn+1 ⊆ CΣn over Πn+1 theorems (Sect. 4, Thm. 15).
(2) CA and PA proofs of the same theorem differ only exponentially in size (Sect. 6, Thm. 32).
(3) CΣn ⊆ IΣn+1 over all theorems (Sect. 7, Thm. 35).
(1) is obtained by proof theoretic techniques, relying on normal forms and structural
manipulations of Peano Arithmetic proofs. It improves upon the natural result that IΣn ⊆
CΣn, although induces a non-elementary blowup in the size of proofs. (2) is obtained via
a certain ‘uniformisation’ of the approach of [Sim17]. In particular, by specialising the key
intermediate results to the case of cyclic proofs, we are able to extract small PA proofs of
some required properties of infinite word automata from analogous ones in ‘second-order’
(SO) arithmetic. Finally, (3) is obtained by calibrating the argument of (2) with recent
results on the reverse mathematics of Bu¨chi’s theorem [KMPM16], allowing us to bound
the logical complexity of proofs in the simulation. Together, these results almost completely
characterise the logical and proof complexity theoretic strength of cyclic proofs in arithmetic,
answering the questions (ii) and (iii), Sect. 7 of [Sim17].
After demonstrating these results, we give a metamathematical analysis of provability
in cyclic theories, in particular showing that the consistency of CΣn is provable in IΣn+2
but not IΣn+1, by appealing to a form of Go¨del incompleteness for cyclic theories. We also
use these observations to show that certain formulations of McNaughton’s theorem, that
every nondeterministic Bu¨chi automaton has an equivalent deterministic parity (or Rabin,
Muller, etc.) automaton, are not provable in the SO theory RCA0. The general question of
the logical strength of McNaughton’s theorem was left open in the aforementioned recent
work [KMPM16].
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Structure of the paper. In Sects. 2 and 3 we introduce some preliminaries on Peano
Arithmetic, proof theory, cyclic proofs and automaton theory. In Sect. 4 we present (1) and
give an example of the translation in App. A. The contents of Sects. 2 - 4 and App. A are
more-or-less self contained and should be accessible to the general proof theorist.
We briefly introduce some SO theories of arithmetic in Sect. 5 that are conservative over
the fragments of PA we need in order to conduct some of the intermediate arguments on
infinite word automata. In Sect. 6 we present (2), and in Sect. 7 we adapt the argument to
obtain (3). In Sect. 8 we give our metamathematical analysis of cyclic theories, and in Sect. 9
we explain their consequences for the logical strength of certain forms of McNaughton’s
theorem. We conclude with some further remarks and perspectives in Sect. 10, including
a comparison with the results of [Sim17] and [BT17b]. For these sections it would be
helpful for the reader to have some background in subsystems of second-order arithmetic
(see e.g. [Sim09, Hir14]), ω-automaton theory (see e.g. [Tho97]) and metamathematics of
first-order arithmetic (see e.g. [HP93]), though we aim to give sufficient details for the
general proof theorist to appreciate the content.
2. Preliminaries on first-order arithmetic proof theory
We present only brief preliminaries, but the reader is encouraged to consult, e.g., [Bus98]
for a more thorough introduction to first-order arithmetic (we will follow that exposition
here).
We work in first-order (FO) logic with equality, =, with variables written x, y, z etc.,
terms written s, t, u etc., and formulae written ϕ,ψ etc., construed over the logical basis
{¬,∨,∧,∃,∀}. We will usually assume formulae are in De Morgan normal form, with
negation restricted to atomic formulae. Nonetheless, we may write ¬ϕ for the De Morgan
‘dual’ of ϕ, defined as follows:
¬¬ϕ := ϕ
¬(ϕ ∧ ψ) := ¬ϕ ∨ ¬ψ
¬(ϕ ∨ ψ) := ¬ϕ ∧ ¬ψ
¬∀x.ϕ := ∃x.¬ϕ
¬∃x.ϕ := ∀x.¬ϕ
We also write ϕ ⊃ ψ for ¬ϕ ∨ ψ and ϕ ≡ ψ for (ϕ ⊃ ψ) ∧ (ψ ⊃ ϕ).
FO logic has equality ‘built-in’, i.e. we always assume the following axioms are present:
(eq1) ∀x.x = x.
(eq2) ∀~x, ~y.((x1 = y1 ∧ · · · ∧ xk = yk) ⊃ f(~x) = f(~y), for each k ∈ N and each function
symbol f of arity k.
(eq3) ∀x, y.(((x1 = y1 ∧ · · · ∧ xk = yk) ∧ P (~x)) ⊃ P (~y)), for each k ∈ N and each predicate
symbol P of arity k.
Following [Sim17], the language of arithmetic (with inequality) is formulated as
{0, s,+,×, <}, with their usual interpretations over N. A theory is a set T of closed
formulae over this language. We write T ⊢ ϕ if ϕ is a logical consequence of T . We write
T1 ⊆ T2 if T1 ⊢ ϕ implies T2 ⊢ ϕ, and T1 = T2 if T1 ⊆ T2 and T2 ⊆ T1.
The theory of Robinson arithmetic (with inequality), written Q, is axiomatised by:
(Q1) ∀x.sx 6= 0.
(Q2) ∀x, y.(sx = sy ⊃ x = y).
(Q3) ∀x.(x 6= 0 ⊃ ∃y.x = sy).
(Q4) ∀x. x+ 0 = x.
(Q5) ∀x, y. x+ sy = s(x+ y).
(Q6) ∀x. x · 0 = 0.
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(Q7) ∀x, y. x · sy = x · y + x.
(Q8) ∀x, y.(x < y ≡ ∃z.(x+ sz = y))
Notice that, above and elsewhere, we may write · instead of × in terms, or even omit the
symbol altogether, and we assume it binds more strongly than +. We also write ∀x < t.ϕ
and ∃x < t.ϕ as abbreviations for ∀x.(x < t ⊃ ϕ) and ∃x.(x < t ∧ ϕ) resp. Formulae with
only such quantifiers are called bounded.
As usual, we may assume that Q is axiomatised by the universal closures of bounded
formulae. In particular the existential quantifiers in axioms (Q3) and (Q8) above may
be bounded by x and y resp., provably under quantifier-free induction. We will implicitly
assume this bounded axiomatisation for the sequent calculus formulation of arithmetic later.
Remark 1. Our basic axioms and, later, our inference rules differ slightly from those in
[Sim17], however it is routine to see that the theories PA and CA defined in this work
coincide with those of [Sim17]. In particular the axiomatisations are equivalent once even
open induction is present (this is weaker than any theory we will consider). We chose a
slightly different presentation so that we could readily apply certain metalogical results,
such as Thm. 5, with no intermediate proof manipulation.
Definition 2 (Arithmetical hierarchy). For n ≥ 0, we define:
• ∆0 = Π0 = Σ0 is the class of bounded formulae.
• Σn+1 is the class of formulae of the form ∃~x.ϕ, where ϕ ∈ Πn.
• Πn+1 is the class of formulae of the form ∀~x.ϕ, where ϕ ∈ Σn.
Notice in particular that, due to De Morgan normal form, if ϕ ∈ Σn then ¬ϕ ∈ Πn and
vice-versa. In practice we often consider these classes of formulae up to logical equivalence.
We say that a formula is in ∆n (in a theory T ) if it is equivalent to both a Σn and Πn
formula (resp. provably in T ).
Definition 3 (Arithmetic). Peano Arithmetic (PA) is axiomatised by Q and the axiom
schema of induction:
(ϕ(0) ∧ ∀x.(ϕ(x) ⊃ ϕ(sx))) ⊃ ∀x.ϕ(x) (2.1)
For a class of formulae Φ, we write Φ-IND for the set of induction axiom instances when
ϕ ∈ Φ in (2.1). Furthermore, we write IΦ for the theory Q+Φ-IND.
The following is a classical result:
Proposition 4 (See e.g. [Bus98, Kay91]). For n ≥ 0, we have IΣn = IΠn.
2.1. A sequent calculus presentation of PA. We will work with a standard sequent
calculus presentation of FO logic, given in Fig. 1, where i ∈ {0, 1} and a, known as the
‘eigenvariable’, is fresh, i.e. does not occur free in the lower sequent. Two important consid-
erations are that we work with cedents as sets, i.e. there is no explicit need for contraction
rules, and that we have an explicit substitution rule. In the θ-sub rule the ‘substitution’
θ is a mapping from variables to terms, which is extended in the natural way to cedents.
Substitution is important for the definition of a cyclic arithmetic proof in the next section,
but does not change provability in usual proofs.
The sequent calculus for Q is obtained from the FO calculus in the language of arith-
metic by adding appropriate initial sequents for each instantiation of an axiom of Q by terms.
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id
Γ, ϕ⇒ ∆, ϕ
=1
Γ⇒ ∆, t = t
=2
Γ, s1 = t1, . . . , sk = tk ⇒ ∆, f(~s) = f(~t)
¬-l
Γ, ϕ,¬ϕ⇒ ∆
¬-r
Γ⇒ ∆, ϕ,¬ϕ
=3
Γ, s1 = t1, . . . , sk = tk, P (~s)⇒ ∆, P (~t)
Γ⇒ ∆
θ-sub
θ(Γ)⇒ θ(∆)
Γ⇒ ∆, ϕ Γ, ϕ⇒ ∆
cut
Γ⇒ ∆
Γ⇒ ∆
wk
Γ,Γ′ ⇒ ∆,∆′
Γ, ϕ⇒ ∆ Γ, ψ ⇒ ∆
∨-l
Γ, ϕ ∨ ψ ⇒ ∆
Γ, ϕi ⇒ ∆
∧-l
Γ, ϕ0 ∧ ϕ1 ⇒ ∆
Γ, ϕ[a/x]⇒ ∆
∃-l
Γ,∃x.ϕ⇒ ∆
Γ, ϕ[t/x]⇒ ∆
∀-l
Γ,∀x.ϕ⇒ ∆
Γ⇒ ∆, ϕ Γ⇒ ∆, ψ
∧-r
Γ⇒ ∆, ϕ ∧ ψ
Γ⇒ ∆, ϕi
∨-r
Γ⇒ ∆, ϕ0 ∨ ϕ1
Γ⇒ ∆, ϕ[a/x]
∀-r
Γ⇒ ∆,∀x.ϕ
Γ⇒ ∆, ϕ[t/x]
∃-r
Γ⇒ ∆,∃x.ϕ
Figure 1: The sequent calculus for FO logic with equality, where a occurs only as indicated
and i ∈ {0, 1}.
For theories extending Q by (at least quantifier-free) induction, we assume that these intial
sequents contain only ∆0 formulae by appropriately bounding the existential quantifiers.
The schema Φ-IND, for Φ closed under subformulas and substitution, is implemented in the
calculus by adding the induction rule,
Γ⇒ ϕ(0),∆ Γ, ϕ(a)⇒ ϕ(sa),∆
ind
Γ⇒ ϕ(t),∆
for formulae ϕ ∈ Φ. Here we require a to not occur free in the lower sequent. Notice that
this satisfies the subformula property, in the ‘wide’ sense of FO logic, i.e. up to substitution.
For fragments of PA with induction axioms of bounded logical complexity, we also have the
bounded quantifier rules:
Γ, a < s, ϕ(a)⇒ ∆
Γ,∃x < s.ϕ(x)⇒ ∆
Γ⇒ ∆, ϕ(t)
Γ, t < s⇒ ∆,∃x < s.ϕ(x)
Γ, a < s⇒ ∆, ϕ(a)
Γ⇒ ∆,∀x < s.ϕ(x)
Γ, ϕ(t)⇒ ∆
Γ, t < s,∀x < s.ϕ(x)⇒ ∆
In all cases the eigenvariable a occurs only as indicated,
The following normalisation result is well-known in the proof theory of arithmetic, and
will be one of our main proof-theoretic tools throughout this work:
Theorem 5 (Free-cut elimination, e.g. [Bus98]). Let S be a sequent system extending FO by
the induction rule and some other nonlogical rules/axioms closed under substitution. Then
any S-proof can be effectively transformed into one of the same conclusion containing only
(substitution instances of) subformulae of the conclusion, an induction formula or a formula
occurring in another nonlogical step.
Naturally, this applies to the various fragments of PA that we consider. In particular,
notice that a proof in IΣn or IΠn of Σn or Πn formulae, resp., contains just Σn or Πn
formulae, resp. It is well known that Thm. 5 can itself be proved within IΣ1 and even
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weaker theories (see, e.g., [HP93]), under an appropriate coding of mathematical objects.
We use this observation later in Sect. 8.
We say that a sequent is Σn (or Πn) if it contains only Σn (resp. Πn) formulae. A slight
issue that will be relevant later in Sect. 4 is that we have not defined Σn and Πn as being
syntactically closed under positive Boolean combinations, even if semantically we know that
they are. In fact, this does not cause a problem for the result above, since we can always
prenex ‘on the fly’ in a proof by cutting against appropriate derivations. For instance, in a
proof, a step of the form,
Γ⇒ ∆,∀x.ϕ Γ⇒ ∆,∀y.ψ
∧
Γ⇒ ∆,∀x.ϕ ∧ ∀y.ψ
may be locally replaced by a derivation of the form:
Γ⇒ ∆,∀x.ϕ
Γ⇒ ∆,∀y.ψ ∀x.ϕ,∀y.ψ ⇒ ∀x, y.(ϕ ∧ ψ)
cut
Γ,∀y.ψ ⇒ ∆,∀x, y.(ϕ ∧ ψ)
cut
Γ⇒ ∆,∀x, y.(ϕ ∧ ψ)
In a similar way we will often assume that a ‘block’ of existential or universal quantifiers is
coded by a single quantifier, using pairings and Go¨del β functions, whose basic properties
are all formalisable already in I∆0 (see, e.g., [Bus98]).
3. Preliminaries on cyclic arithmetic and automata
Before presenting ‘cyclic arithmetic’, we will present the general notion of non-wellfounded
proofs in arithmetic, from [Sim17].
Definition 6. A preproof is a possibly infinite binary tree labeled by sequents in a locally
correct manner in the calculus for Q. Following [Sim17], we treat inference steps as nodes
of the tree and sequents as edges. A preproof is regular if it has only finitely many distinct
subtrees or, equivalently, if it is the unfolding of a finite directed graph, possibly with cycles.
The following notions are variants of those from Dfns. 1 and 2 in [Sim17]:
Definition 7 (Precursors, traces, ∞-proofs). Let (Γi ⇒ ∆i)i≥0 be an infinite branch
through a preproof. For terms t, t′ we say that t′ is a precursor of t at i if one of the
following holds:
i) Γi ⇒ ∆i concludes a θ-sub-step and t is θ(t
′).
ii) Γi ⇒ ∆i concludes any other step and t
′ = t occurs in Γi.
iii) Γi ⇒ ∆i concludes any other step and t
′ is t.
A trace along (Γi ⇒ ∆i)i≥0 is a sequence (ti)i≥n, for some n ≥ 0, such that whenever
i ≥ n the term ti occurs in Γi ⇒ ∆i and,
(a) ti+1 is a precursor of ti at i; or
(b) the atomic formula ti+1 < t occurs in Γi+1, where t is a precursor of ti at i.
When (b) holds, we say that the trace progresses at i+ 1.
An ∞-proof is a preproof such that any infinite branch has a trace that progresses
infinitely often. If it is regular then we simply call it a cyclic proof. CA is the theory
induced by cyclic proofs in the calculus for Q.
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Remark 8. When defining explicit traces, for the precursor case iii), we will typically
not worry about whether the term ti in a trace occurs in the sequent or not. All that
matters is that, if the current step is ∃-l, ∀-r or sub, ti does not contain the associated
eigenvariables.1 As long as we satisfy this constraint we may simply consider an equivalent
proof that prepends ti = ti to the antecedent to make sure that ti ‘occurs’. We use this
assumption implicitly in the remainder of this work.
The reader may consult [Sim17] for several examples of ∞-proofs. Notably, ∞-proofs
are sound and complete for the standard model N (Thm. 4, [Sim17]). (Similar results
for other logics, with respect to standard models, were known before [Bro06, BS11].) We
recall the proof since we will have to formalise a variant of it in Sect. 6, and also since the
quantifier case in the argument of [Sim17] is omitted, whereas this subtlety will need some
consideration when it is formalised.
Proposition 9 (Soundness of ∞-proofs). If π is an ∞-proof of ϕ, then N  ϕ.
Proof. Suppose otherwise, i.e. N  ¬ϕ. We will inductively construct an infinite branch
(Γi ⇒ ∆i)i≥0 of π and associated assignments ρi of natural numbers to each sequent’s free
variables, such that N, ρi 2 Γi ⇒ ∆i. Assuming ϕ is closed (by taking its universal closure),
we set Γ0 ⇒ ∆0 to be ⇒ ϕ and ρ0 = ∅.
Each step except for substitution, ∀-r and ∃-l constitutes a true implication, so if
N, ρi 2 Γi ⇒ ∆i then ρi also must not satisfy one of its premisses. We may thus choose one
such premiss as Γi+1 ⇒ ∆i+1 and set ρi+1 = ρi.
If Γi ⇒ ∆i concludes a θ-sub step, we may set ρi+1 = ρi ◦ θ. If Γi ⇒ ∆i concludes a ∀-r
step, let ∀x.ϕ be the principal formula and assume x does not occur free in the conclusion.
Since N, ρi 2 Γi ⇒ ∆i, we must have that N, ρi  ∃x.¬ϕ. We choose a value k ∈ N
witnessing this existential and set ρi+1 = ρi ∪ {x 7→ k}. The ∃-l case is dealt with similarly.
This infinite branch must have an infinitely progressing trace, say (ti)i≥n, by the def-
inition of ∞-proof. However notice that, for i ≥ n, ρi(ti) ≥ ρi+1(ti+1) and, furthermore,
at a progress point along the trace, ρi(ti) > ρi+1(ti+1). Thus, (ρi(ti))i≥n is a monotone
decreasing sequence of natural numbers that does not converge, contradicting the fact that
N is well-ordered.
Later, in Sect. 6, we will use the fact that the choices for generating an invalid branch in
the proof above can be made uniformly in an arithmetic setting.
3.1. Defining CΣn. Simpson proposes in [Sim17] to study systems of cyclic proofs contain-
ing only Σn formulae, and to compare such systems to IΣn. This is rather pertinent in light
of the free-cut elimination result we stated, Thm. 5: any IΣn-proof of a Σn-sequent can
be assumed to contain just Σn formulae (possibly at a non-elementary cost in proof size),
whence the comparison. However, in order to be able to admit routine derivations of more
complex formulae, e.g. the Σn+1 law of excluded middle or the universal closure of a Σn
sequent, we will close this notion under logical consequence.
Definition 10. Let Φ be a set of formulae closed under subformulae and substitution. CΦ
is the first-order theory axiomatised by the universal closures of conclusions of cyclic proofs
containing only Φ-formulae.
1We say that a is an eigenvariable of a θ-sub step if it is in the support of the substitution θ.
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Notice that, by the free-cut elimination result, Thm. 5, and the subformula property,
any CΣn proofs of Σn-sequents contain only Σn-sequents anyway, without loss of generality.
This more ‘robust’ definition allows us to easily compare fragments of cyclic arithmetic. For
instance, we have the following:
Proposition 11. CΣn = CΠn, for n ≥ 0.
Proof. For the left-right inclusion, replace each Σn sequent ~p,Γ ⇒ ∆ with the sequent
~p,∆ ⇒ Γ, where Γ and ∆ contain the De Morgan dual formulae of Γ and ∆ resp. and
~p exhausts the atomic formulae of the antecedent. Any traces will be preserved and the
proof can be made correct by locally adding some logical steps. The converse implication
is proved in the same way.
Using a standard technique, e.g. from [Bro06], we also can rather simply show the
following result:2
Proposition 12. IΣn ⊆ CΣn, for n ≥ 0.
Proof sketch. Given an IΣn proof, we simply simulate every local inference step, the only
nontrivial case being an induction step:
Γ⇒ ϕ(0),∆ Γ, ϕ(a)⇒ ϕ(sa),∆
ind
Γ⇒ ϕ(t),∆
This is simulated by the following cyclic derivation,
Γ⇒ ϕ(0),∆
=
0 = b,Γ⇒ ϕ(b),∆
...
cut •
Γ⇒ ϕ(b),∆
sub
Γ⇒ ϕ(a),∆ Γ, ϕ(a)⇒ ϕ(sa),∆
cut
a < b,Γ⇒ ϕ(sa),∆
b = sa,Γ⇒ ϕ(b),∆
0 < b,Γ⇒ ϕ(b),∆
cut •
Γ⇒ ϕ(b),∆
sub
Γ⇒ ϕ(t),∆
where we have written • to mark roots of identical subtrees. An infinite branch that does
not have a tail in the proofs of the two premisses of ind must hit • infinitely often. Therefore
it admits an infinitely progressing trace alternating between a and b, with the progress point
underlined above.
Following Rmk. 8, notice that, e.g. in the simulation of induction above, traces need
not be connected in the graph of ancestry of a proof. This deviates from other settings
where it is occurrences that are tracked, rather than terms [DBHS16, BDS16, Dou17].
2A similar result was given in [Sim17], but that argument rather shows that IΣn ⊆ CΣn+1.
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3.2. Bu¨chi automata: checking correctness of cyclic proofs. A cyclic preproof can
be effectively checked for correctness by reduction to the inclusion of ‘Bu¨chi automata’,
yielding a PSPACE bound. As far as the author is aware, this is the best known upper
bound, although no corresponding lower bound is known. As we will see later in Sect. 6,
this is one of the reasons why we cannot hope for a ‘polynomial simulation’ of cyclic proofs
in a usual proof system, and so why elementary simulations are more pertinent.
Definition 13. A nondeterministic Bu¨chi automaton (NBA)A is a tuple (A,Q, δ, q0, F )
where: A is a finite set, called the alphabet, Q is a finite set of states, δ ⊆ (Q× A)×Q
is the transition relation, q0 ∈ Q is the initial state, and F ⊆ Q is the set of final or
accepting states. We say that A is deterministic (a DBA) if δ is a function Q×A→ Q.
A ‘word’ (ai)i≥0 ∈ A
ω is accepted or recognised by A if there is a sequence (qi)i≥0 ∈ Q
ω
such that: for each i ≥ 0, (qi, ai, qi+1) ∈ δ, and for infinitely many i ≥ 0 we have qi ∈ F .
From a cyclic preproof π we can easily define two automata, say Aπb and A
π
t ,
3 respec-
tively accepting just the branches and just the branches with infinitely progressing traces.
See [Sim17] for a construction of Aπt . We point out that A
π
b is essentially just the depen-
dency graph of π with all states final, and so is in fact deterministic;4 we will rely on this
observation later in Sects. 6, 7 and 9. We now state the well-known ‘correctness criterion’
for cyclic proofs:
Proposition 14 ([Sim17]). A cyclic preproof π is a ∞-proof iff L(Aπb ) ⊆ L(A
π
t ).
4. A translation from IΣn+1 to CΣn, over Πn+1-theorems
We show in this section our first result, that cyclic proofs containing only Σn-formulae are
enough to simulate IΣn+1 over not-too-complex formulae:
Theorem 15. IΣn+1 ⊆ CΣn, over Πn+1 theorems, for n ≥ 0.
One example of such logical power in cyclic proofs was given in [Sim17], in the form of
CΣ1 proofs of the totality of the Ackermann-Pe´ter function. This already separates it from
IΣ1, which only proves the totality of the primitive recursive functions [Par72]. To prove
the theorem above, we will rather work in IΠn+1, cf. Prop. 4, since the exposition is more
intuitive. We first prove the following intermediate lemma.
Lemma 16. Let π be a IΠn+1 proof, containing only Πn+1 formulae, of a sequent,
Γ,∀x1.ϕ1, . . . ,∀xl.ϕl ⇒ ∆,∀y1.ψ1, . . . ,∀ym.ψm (4.1)
where Γ,∆, ϕi, ψj are Σn and xi, yj occur only in ϕi, ψj respectively. Then there is a CΣn
derivation ⌈π⌉ of the form:
{Γ⇒ ∆, ϕi}i≤l
⌈π⌉
Γ⇒ ∆, ψ1, . . . , ψm
Moreover, no free variables of (4.1) occur as eigenvariables for ∃-l, ∀-r or sub steps in ⌈π⌉.
3These are rather called Bp and Bt respectively in [Sim17].
4Technically the transition relation here is not total, but this can be ‘completed’ in the usual way by
adding a non-final ‘sink’ state for any outstanding transitions.
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Proof. We proceed by induction on the structure of π. Notice that we may assume that any
Πn+1 formulae occurring have just a single outermost ∀ quantifier, by interpreting arguments
as pairs and using Go¨del’s β functions. (This introduces only cuts on formulae of the same
form.) We henceforth write ~ϕ for ϕ1, . . . , ϕl and ~ψ for ψ1, . . . , ψm and, as an abuse of
notation, ∀~x.~ϕ and ∀~y.~ψ for ∀x1.ϕ1, . . . ,∀xl.ϕl and ∀y1.ψ1, . . . ,∀ym.ψm respectively. (Notice
that this is a reasonable abuse of notation, since ∀s can be prenexed outside conjunctions
and disjunctions already in pure FO logic.)
Propositional logical steps are easily dealt with, relying on invertibility and cuts, with
possible structural steps. Importantly, due to the statement of the lemma, such steps apply
to only Σn formulae (recall the discussion at the end of Sect. 2). For instance, if π extends
a proof π′ by a ∧-left step,
Γ, χ0, χ1,∀~x.~ϕ⇒ ∆,∀~y.~ψ
∧-l
Γ, χ0 ∧ χ1,∀~x.~ϕ⇒ ∆,∀~y.~ψ
then we define ⌈π⌉ as,
 χ0, χ1 ⇒ χ0 ∧ χ1 Γ, χ0 ∧ χ1 ⇒ ∆, ϕicut
Γ, χ0, χ1 ⇒ ∆, ϕi


i≤l
⌈π′⌉
Γ, χ0, χ1 ⇒ ∆, ~ψ
∧-l
Γ, χ0 ∧ χ1 ⇒ ∆, ~ψ
and if π extends proofs π0 and π1 by a ∧-right step,
Γ,∀~x.~ϕ⇒ ∆, χ0,∀~y.~ψ Γ,∀~x.~ϕ⇒ ∆, χ1,∀~y.~ψ
∧-r
Γ,∀~x.~ϕ⇒ ∆, χ0 ∧ χ1,∀~y.~ψ
then we define ⌈π⌉ as: 
 Γ⇒ ∆, χ0 ∧ χ1, ϕi χ0 ∧ χ1 ⇒ χjcut
Γ⇒ ∆, χj , ϕi


i≤l
⌈πj⌉
Γ⇒ ∆, χj, ~ψ
∧-r ∀j < 2
Γ⇒ ∆, χ0 ∧ χ1, ~ψ
If π extends a proof π′ by a thinning step,
Γ,∀~x.~ϕ⇒ ∆,∀~y.~ψ
wk
Γ′,Π,Γ,∀~x.~ϕ⇒ ∆,∀~y.~ψ,∆′,∀~z.~χ
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where Γ′,∆′, ~χ are Σn and Π is Πn+1, then we define ⌈π⌉ as:
{Γ′,Γ⇒ ∆, ϕi,∆
′}i≤l
Γ′,⌈π′⌉,∆′
Γ′,Γ⇒ ∆, ~ψ,∆′
wk
Γ′,Γ⇒ ∆, ~ψ,∆′, ~χ
where Γ′, ⌈π′⌉,∆′ is obtained from ⌈π′⌉ by prepending Γ′ and appending ∆′ to each sequent.
For this we might need to rename some free variables in π′ so that eigenvariable conditions
are preserved after the transformation; this does not affect the cedents Γ,∆ by the assump-
tion from the inductive hypothesis. Notice that we are simply ignoring the extra premisses
due to Π.
If π extends proofs π0 and π1 by a cut step on a Πn+1 formula,
Γ,∀~x.~ϕ⇒ ∆,∀~y.~ψ,∀z.χ Γ,∀~x.~ϕ,∀z.χ⇒ ∆,∀~y.~ψ
cut
Γ,∀~x.~ϕ⇒ ∆,∀~y.~ψ
then we define ⌈π⌉ as:
{Γ⇒ ∆, ϕi}i≤l
⌈π0⌉
Γ⇒ ∆, ~ψ, χ
{
Γ⇒ ∆, ϕi
wk
Γ⇒ ∆, ~ψ, ϕi
}
i≤l
⌈π1⌉, ~ψ
Γ⇒ ∆, ~ψ, ~ψ
........................
Γ⇒ ∆, ~ψ
The final dotted ‘contraction’ step is implicit, since we treat cedents as sets. Again, we
might need to rename some variables in π1. If instead the cut formula were Σn, say χ, we
would define ⌈π⌉ as:
{Γ⇒ ∆, ϕi}i≤l
⌈π0⌉
Γ⇒ ∆, χ, ~ψ
{
Γ⇒ ∆, ϕi
wk
Γ, χ⇒ ∆, ϕi
}
i≤l
⌈π1⌉
Γ, χ⇒ ∆, ~ψ
cut
Γ⇒ ∆, ~ψ
If π extends a proof π′ by a ∀-left step,
Γ, χ(t),∀~x.~ϕ⇒ ∆,∀~y.~ψ
∀-l
Γ,∀z.χ(z),∀~x.~ϕ⇒ ∆,∀~y.~ψ
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where ∀z.χ(z) is Πn+1, we define ⌈π⌉ as follows:
Γ⇒ ∆, χ(z)
sub
Γ⇒ ∆, χ(t)
{
Γ⇒ ∆, ϕi
wk
Γ, χ(t)⇒ ∆, ϕi
}
i≤l
⌈π′⌉
Γ, χ(t)⇒ ∆, ~ψ
cut
Γ⇒ ∆, ~ψ
(Notice that, although z occurs as an eigenvariable for a sub step here, it is already bound
in the conclusion of π, so we preserve the inductive hypothesis.) If π extends a proof π′ by
a ∀-right step,
Γ,∀~x.~ϕ⇒ ∆,∀~y.~ψ, χ
∀-r
Γ,∀~x.~ϕ⇒ ∆,∀~y.~ψ,∀z.χ
where ∀z.χ is Πn+1, then we define ⌈π⌉ as:{
Γ⇒ ∆, ϕi
wk
Γ⇒ ∆, ϕi, χ
}
i≤l
⌈π′⌉
Γ⇒ ∆, ~ψ, χ
If π extends a proof π′ by a ∃-right step,
Γ,∀~x.~ϕ⇒ ∆,∀~y.~ψ, χ(t)
∃-r
Γ,∀~x.~ϕ⇒ ∆,∀~y.~ψ,∃z.χ(z)
where ∃z.χ(z) is Σn, then we define ⌈π⌉ as:{
Γ⇒ ∆, ϕi,∃z.χ(z)
wk
Γ⇒ ∆, ϕi, χ(t),∃z.χ(z)
}
i≤l
⌈π′⌉,∃z.χ(z)
Γ⇒ ∆, ~ψ, χ(t),∃z.χ(z)
∃-r
Γ⇒ ∆, ~ψ,∃z.χ(z)
Again, some eigenvariables of π′ might have to be renamed. Any other quantifier steps are
dealt with routinely.
Finally, if π extends proofs π0 and π
′ by an induction step,
Γ,∀~x.~ϕ⇒ ∆,∀~y.~ψ,∀z.χ(0) Γ,∀~x.~ϕ,∀z.χ(c)⇒ ∆,∀~y.~ψ,∀z.χ(sc)
ind
Γ,∀~x.~ϕ⇒ ∆,∀~y.~ψ,∀z.χ(t)
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we define ⌈π⌉ to be the following cyclic proof,
{Γ⇒ ∆, ϕi}i≤l
⌈π0⌉
Γ⇒ ∆, ~ψ, χ(0)
d = 0,Γ⇒ ∆, ~ψ, χ(d)
...
•
Γ⇒ ∆, ~ψ, χ(d)
sub
Γ⇒ ∆, ~ψ, χ(c)
{
Γ⇒ ∆, ϕi
wk
Γ⇒ ∆, ~ψ, ϕi
}
i≤l
⌈π′⌉, ~ψ
Γ⇒ ∆, ~ψ, χ(sc)
c < d, d = sc,Γ⇒ ∆, ~ψ, χ(d)
•
Γ⇒ ∆, ~ψ, χ(d)
sub
Γ⇒ ∆, ~ψ, χ(t)
where we have written • to mark roots of identical subtrees. Notice that any branch hitting
• infinitely often will have an infinitely progressing trace alternating between c and d, by the
underlined progress point c < d: thanks to the assumption from the inductive hypothesis,
c will not occur in ⌈π′⌉ as an eigenvariable for ∃-l, ∀-r or sub steps so the trace along c in
⌈π′⌉ remains intact, cf. Rmk. 8. Any other infinite branch has a tail that is already in ⌈π′⌉
or ⌈π0⌉ and so has an infinitely progressing trace by the inductive hypothesis.
The lemma above gives us a simple proof of the main result of this section:
Proof of Thm. 15. Let π is a IΠn+1 proof of a sequent⇒ ∀x.ϕ, where ϕ ∈ Σn, under Prop. 4.
By Thm. 5 we may assume that π contains only Πn+1 cuts, whence we may simply apply
Lemma 16 to obtain a CΣn proof of ⇒ ϕ. (Notice that there are no assumption sequents
after applying the lemma since the antecedent is empty.) Now the result follows simply by
an application of ∀-r.
For the interested reader, we have given an example of this translation in action in
App. A, for a ‘relativised’ version of arithmetic with an uninterpreted function symbol.
5. Second-order theories for reasoning about automata
We now consider a two-sorted, or ‘second-order’ (SO), version of FO logic, with variables
X,Y,Z, etc. ranging over sets of individuals, and new atomic formulae t ∈ X, sometimes
written X(t). We also have SO quantifiers binding the SO variables with the natural
interpretation. Again, we give only brief preliminaries, but the reader is encouraged to
consult the standard texts [Sim09] and [Hir14].
We write Q2 for an appropriate extension of Q by basic axioms governing sets (see, e.g.,
[Sim09] or [Hir14]), and write Σ0n and Π
0
n for the classes Σn and Πn respectively, but now
allowing free set variables to occur.
Definition 17. The recursive comprehension axiom schema is the following:5
∆01-CA : ∀~y,
~Y .(∀x.(ϕ(x, ~y, ~Y ) ≡ ¬ψ(x, ~y, ~Y )) ⊃ ∃X.∀x.(X(x) ≡ ϕ(x)))
5Notice that there is an unfortunate coincidence of the notation CA for ‘comprehension axiom’ and ‘cyclic
arithmetic’, but the context of use should always avoid any ambiguity.
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where ϕ,ψ are in Σ01 and X does not occur free in ϕ or ψ. From here, the theory RCA0 is
defined as Q2 +∆
0
1-CA+Σ
0
1-IND.
Since we will always work in extensions of RCA0, which proves the totality of primitive
recursive functions, we will conservatively add function symbols for primitive recursive
functions on individuals whenever we need them. We will also henceforth consider FO
theories extended by ‘oracles’, i.e. uninterpreted set/predicate variables, in order to access
‘uniform’ classes of FO proofs. We write IΣn(X) for the same class of proofs as IΣn but
where X is allowed to occur as a predicate symbol. The usefulness of a IΣn(X) proof is
that we may later substitute X for a FO formula, say ϕ(−) ∈ ∆m+1, to arrive at a IΣm+n
proof of size O(|ϕ|). This ‘parametrisation’ of a FO proof allows us to avoid unnecessary
blowups in proof size induced by ‘non-uniform’ translations from second-order theories; we
implicitly use this observation for proof complexity bounds later, particularly in Sect. 6.
The following result is an adaptation of well known conservativity results, e.g. as found
in [Sim09, Hir14], but we include a proof anyway for completeness.
Proposition 18. RCA0 +Σ
0
n-IND is conservative over IΣn(X).
Proof sketch. First we introduce countably many fresh set symbols X
~t,~Y
ϕ,ψ, indexed by Σ
0
1
formulae ϕ(x, ~x, ~X), ψ(x, ~x, ~X) with all free variables indicated, FO terms ~t with |~t| = |~x|
and SO variables ~Y with |~Y | = | ~X |. These will serve as witnesses to the sets defined by
comprehension. We replace the comprehension axioms by initial sequents of the form:
Γ,∀x.(ϕ(x,~t, ~Y ) ≡ ¬ψ(x,~t, ~Y )), ϕ(t,~t, ~Y )⇒ t ∈ X
~t,~Y
ϕ,ψ,∆
(5.1)
Γ,∀x.(ϕ(x,~t, ~Y ) ≡ ¬ψ(x,~t, ~Y )), t ∈ X
~t,~Y
ϕ,ψ ⇒ ϕ(t,
~t, ~Y ),∆
(5.2)
It is routine to show that these new initial sequents are equivalent to the comprehension
axioms for ϕ,ψ.
Now we apply free-cut elimination, Thm. 5, to a proof in such a system and replace
every positive occurrence of t ∈ X
~t,~Y
ϕ,ψ with ϕ(t,
~t, ~Y ), and every negative occurrence, i.e. an
occurrence of t /∈ X
~t,~Y
ϕ,ψ with ψ(t,
~t, ~Y ). (Recall here that we assume formulae are in De Mor-
gan normal form.) Any comprehension initial sequents affected by this replacement become
identities in the case of (5.1), and purely logical theorems in the case of (5.2). Furthermore,
any induction formulae remain Σ01, provably in pure logic, thanks to our consideration of
positive and negative contexts. Any extraneous free set variables in induction steps (except
X), e.g. Y , may be safely dealt with by replacing any atomic formula Y (s) with ⊤. The
resulting proof is in IΣn(X).
It is worth pointing out that, in general, the transformation from a SO proof to a FO
proof can yield a possibly non-elementary blowup in the size of proofs, due to, e.g., the
application of (free-)cut elimination.
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5.1. Formalisation of Bu¨chi acceptance. From now on we will be rather informal when
talking about finite objects, e.g. automata, finite sequences, or even formulae. In particular
we may freely use such objects within object-level formulae when, in fact, we are formally
referring to their ‘Go¨del numbers’. Also, statements inside quotations, “-”, will usually be
(provably) recursive in any free variables occurring, i.e. ∆01. This way quantifier complexity
is safely measured by just the quantifiers outside quotations.
We may treat a set symbol X as a binary predicate by interpreting its argument as a
pair and using Go¨del’s ‘β functions’ to primitive-recursively extract its components. We
use such predicates to encode sequences by interpreting X(x, y) as “the xth symbol of X
is y”. Axiomatically, this means we presume we have already the totality and determinism
of X as a binary relation. Formally, for a set S and a set symbol X treated as a binary
predicate, we will write X ∈ Sω for the conjunction of the following two formulae,
∀x.∃y ∈ S.X(x, y) (5.3)
∀x, y, z.((X(x, y) ∧X(x, z)) ⊃ y = z) (5.4)
i.e. X is, in fact, the graph of a function N→ S. When we know that these formulae hold
true for X, we may construe the expression X(x) as a term in formulae, for instance writing
ϕ(X(x)) as shorthand for ∃y.(X(x, y) ∧ ϕ(y)) or, equivalently, ∀y.(X(x, y) ⊃ ϕ(y)).
Definition 19 (Language membership). Let A = (A,Q, δ, q0, F ) be a NBA and treat X a
binary predicate symbol. We define the formula X ∈ L(A) as:
X ∈ Aω ∧ ∃Y ∈ Qω.

 Y (0, q0)∧ ∀x. (Y (x),X(x), Y (sx)) ∈ δ
∧ ∀x.∃x′ > x. Y (x′) ∈ F

 (5.5)
If A is deterministic and X ∈ Aω, we write qX(x, y) for “y is the x
th state of the run of X on
A”, which is provably ∆01 in RCA0. Similarly to the case when X is the graph of a function
(cf. 5.4,5.3), we may write ϕ(qX(x)) as shorthand for ∃y.(qX(x, y) ∧ ϕ(y)) or, equivalently
in RCA0, for ∀y.(qX(x, y) ⊃ ϕ(y)). For DBA, we alternatively define X ∈ L(A) as:
X ∈ Aω ∧ ∀x.∃x′ > x. qX(x
′) ∈ F (5.6)
This ‘double definition’ will not be problematic for us, since RCA0 can check if an automaton
is deterministic or not and, if so, even prove the equivalence between the two definitions:
Proposition 20. RCA0 ⊢ ∀ DBA A.((5.5) ≡ (5.6)).
Proof sketch. Let A = (A,Q, δ, q0, F ) be a deterministic automaton. For the left-right
direction let Y ∈ Qω be an ‘accepting run’ of X on A and use induction to show that
Y (x, qX(x)). For the right-left direction, we use comprehension to define an ‘accepting run’
Y ∈ Qω by: Y (x, q) ≡ qX(x, q). Clearly the definition of Y is ∆
0
1, and we can show that
such Y is a ‘correct run’ by induction on x.
Notice that, for a deterministic automaton, the formula for acceptance is arithmetical
in X, i.e. there are no SO quantifiers. This will be rather important for uniformity in the
simulation of cyclic proofs in the next section.
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5.2. Formalisations of some automaton constructions. Recall that we may freely add
symbols for primitive recursive functions to our language. Since we rely on various results
from [KMPM16] as the ‘engine’ behind some of our proofs, we will use their notions for
manipulating automata.
For NBA A,A′, we write Ac and A⊔A′ to denote the complement and union construc-
tions of automata from [KMPM16] (cf. Sects. A and C resp.). We also write Empty(A) for
the recursive algorithm from [KMPM16] (cf. Sect. C.1), expressed as a Σ1 formula in A,
determining whether A computes the empty language. It will also be useful for us later, in
order to bound logical and proof complexity, to notice that DBA can already be comple-
mented in RCA0. This is a rather unsurprising result but does not appear in [KMPM16],
so we give it here.
For a DBA A = (A,Q, δ, q0, F ), we define a complementary NBA A
c as follows,
Ac := (A, (Q × {0}) ∪ ((Q \ F )× {1}), (q0, 0), δ
c, (Q \ F )× {1})
where δc ⊆ (Qc ×A)×Qc (writing Qc for Q× {0} ∪ (Q \ F )× {1}) is defined as:
{((q, 0), a, (q′ , 0)) : (q, a, q′) ∈ δ}
∪ {((q, i), a, (q′ , 1)) : (q, a, q′) ∈ δ, i = 0, 1, q′ ∈ Q \ F}
The idea behind this construction is that a run of Ac follows A freely for some finite time
(in the ‘0’ component), after which it may no longer visit final states of A (once in the ‘1’
component). The determinism of A guarantees that such a word is not accepted by it.
By directly inspecting the definitions from [KMPM16], and DBA complementation
above, we have the following properties:
Observation 21. For NBA A,A′ we have that:
(1) Empty(A) is a polynomial-time predicate in A.
(2) A ⊔A′ is constructible in polynomial-time from A and A′.
(3) Ac is constructible in exponential-time from A.
For a DBA A, we have that:
(4) Ac is constructible in polynomial-time from A.
None of these bounds are surprising, due to known bounds on the complexity of union, com-
plementation and emptiness checking for (non)deterministic Bu¨chi automata. Nonetheless
it is important to state them for the particular constructions used in this work for bounds
on proof complexity later.
Lemma 22. From [KMPM16] we have the following:
(1) RCA0 ⊢ ∀ NBA A.(Empty(A) ≡ ∀X ∈ A
ω.X /∈ L(A)).
(2) RCA0 ⊢ ∀ NBA A1,A2.(X ∈ L(A1 ⊔ A2) ≡ (X ∈ L(A1) ∨X ∈ L(A2))).
(3) RCA0 +Σ
0
2-IND ⊢ ∀ NBA A.(X ∈ A
ω ⊃ (X ∈ L(Ac) ≡ X /∈ L(A))).
We also have that:
(4) RCA0 ⊢ ∀ DBA A. (X ∈ A
ω ⊃ (X ∈ L(Ac) ≡ X /∈ L(A))).
Proof. 1, 2 and 3 follow from [KMPM16], namely Lemma 14, Thm. 13 and Thms. 5 and
12, respectively, so we give a proof of 4.
Working in RCA0, let A = (A,Q, δ, q0, F ) be a DBA. For the right-left implication, if
X /∈ L(A) then ∃x.∀x′ > x. qX(x) /∈ F , so let x0 witness this existential. Now, define by
comprehension the run Y ∈ (Qc)ω as follows:
Y (x, y) ≡ ((x ≤ x0 ∧ y = (qX(x), 0)) ∨ (x > x0 ∧ y = (qX(x), 1)))
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Now, indeed Y (0, (q0, 0)), since qX(0) = q0, and Y is a correct run of X on A
c by considering
separately the cases x < x0, x = x0 and x > x0. Finally, for any x, Y hits a final state at
max(x, x0) + 1 > x.
For the left-right implication, suppose X ∈ L(Ac) and let Y ∈ (Qc)ω be an accepting
run. By induction we have ∀x.(Y (x) = (qX(x), 0) ∨ Y (x) = (qX(x), 1)). Now, Y must
eventually hit an accepting state of Ac, i.e. in the 1-component, say at position x0. Again
by induction, we may show that Y remains in the 1-component of Ac after x0, and hence
qX(x) /∈ F for x ≥ x0, as required.
6. An exponential simulation of CA in PA
In this section we will adapt Simpson’s approach in [Sim17] for showing that CA ⊆ PA
into a uniform result in PA. This essentially constitutes a formalisation of the soundness
argument, Prop. 9, in a SO theory conservative over the target fragment of PA. The
‘uniformity’ we aim for ensures that the possibly non-elementary blowup translating from
SO proofs to FO proofs occurs once and for all for a single arithmetical theorem. Only then
do we instantiate the theorem (inside PA) by the cyclic proof in question, leading to an only
elementary blowup.
To give an idea of how the result is obtained, and how our exposition refines that of
[Sim17], we take advantage of the following aspects of the soundness argument for cyclic
proofs:
(a) The Bu¨chi automaton accepting all infinite branches of a cyclic proof is, in fact, deter-
ministic, and so we can express acceptance of an ω-word in this automaton arithmeti-
cally.
(b) A branch of invalid sequents and corresponding assignments, as in the proof of Prop. 9,
can be uniformly generated from an initial unsatisfying assignment by an arithmetical
formula.
(c) Since all inductions are only up to ω, we need only arbitrarily often progressing traces,
rather than explicit infinitely progressing traces.
Together, these properties give us just enough ‘wiggle room’ to carry out the soundness
argument in a sufficiently uniform way.
Throughout this section we will also carefully track how much quantifier complexity is
used in theorem statements, since we will later modify this argument to obtain a converse
result to Thm. 15.
6.1. An arithmetically uniform treatment of automata. Referring to (c) above, we
define an arithmetical corollary of NBA acceptance that is nonetheless sufficiently strong
to formalise the soundness argument for cyclic proofs:
Definition 23 (Arithmetic acceptance). Let A be a NBA and temporarily write:
• F (x) := “x is a finite run of X on A ending at a final state”.
• E(z, x, y) := “z extends x to a finite run of X on A hitting ≥ y final states”
We define:
ArAcc(X,A) := X ∈ Aω ∧ ∃x. (F (x) ∧ ∀y.∃z.E(z, x, y)) (6.1)
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For intuition, we may consider ω-regular expressions rather than automata, which are of
the form
∑
i<n
ei · f
ω
i , for some n ∈ N, without loss of generality. The formula ArAcc for this
expression essentially recognises infinite words that have prefixes of the form στk for some
σ ∈ L(ei), for some i < n, and τk ∈ L(f
k
i ) for each k ∈ N. Clearly the condition ArAcc is a
consequence of acceptance itself:
Proposition 24. RCA0 ⊢ ∀A.(X ∈ L(A) ⊃ ArAcc(X,A)).
Proof. Working in RCA0, fix A = (A,Q, δ, q0, F ) and suppose X ∈ L(A). Let Y ∈ Q
ω be
an ‘accepting run’ of X on A, cf. (5.5). We may show that,
∃z ∈ Q∗.“z is a finite prefix of Y hitting ≥ y final states in A” (6.2)
by Σ01-induction on y, appealing to the unboundedness of final states in Y for both the
base case and the inductive steps. Now, in the definition of ArAcc in (6.1), we set x to
be the least such z for which (6.2)[1/y] holds (again by induction), so that F (x) from (6.1)
holds. Thus, for any y ∈ N, we may find an appropriate z making E(z, x, y) in (6.1) true
by appealing to (6.2). The fact that z extends x follows from leastness of x and that Y is
a sequence, cf. (5.3) and (5.4).
Let us write A1 ⊑ A2 for Empty((A
c
1 ⊔A2)
c). We may now present our main ‘uniform’
result needed to carry out our soundness proof in FO theories.
Theorem 25. RCA0 +Σ
0
2-IND proves:
∀ DBA A1,∀ NBA A2. ((A1 ⊑ A2 ∧X ∈ L(A1)) ⊃ ArAcc(X,A2)) (6.3)
Proof. Working in RCA0+Σ
0
2-IND, let A1 be a DBA and A2 be a NBA such that X ∈ L(A1)
and A1 ⊑ A2. We have:
Empty((Ac1 ⊔ A2)
c) since A1 ⊑ A2
=⇒ ∀Y ∈ Aω. Y /∈ L((Ac1 ⊔ A2)
c) by Lemma 22.1
=⇒ ∀Y ∈ Aω. Y ∈ L(Ac1 ⊔ A2) by Lemma 22.3
=⇒ ∀Y ∈ Aω.(Y ∈ L(Ac1) ∨ Y ∈ L(A2)) by Lemma 22.2
=⇒ ∀Y ∈ Aω.(Y ∈ L(A1) ⊃ Y ∈ L(A2)) by Lemma 22.4
=⇒ X ∈ L(A2) since X ∈ L(A1)
=⇒ ArAcc(X,A2) by Prop. 24.
Noticing that DBA acceptance is also purely arithmetical inX (cf. (a)), by the conservativity
result Prop. 18, we have:
Corollary 26. IΣ2(X) proves (6.3).
6.2. Formalising the soundness argument for cyclic proofs. At this point we are
able to mostly mimic the formalisation of the soundness argument from [Sim17], although
we must further show that a branch of invalid sequents, cf. the proof of Prop. 9, is uniformly
describable (cf. (b)).
For n ≥ 0, let N, ρ n ϕ be an appropriate ∆n+1 formula (provably in IΣn+1) asserting
that a formula ϕ is true in N under the assignment ρ of its free variables to natural numbers,
as long as ϕ is a Boolean combination of Σn (or Πn) formulae.
6 Formally, the formula
6If ϕ is not a Boolean combination of Σn formulae then N, ρ n ϕ crashes and returns ⊥.
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N, ρ n ϕ takes as arguments the codes of ρ and ϕ, i.e. their Go¨del numbers; the construction
of such a formula for n is standard (see, e.g., [Bus98, Kay91, HP93]) and it has size
polynomial in n. Importantly, there are IΣn+1 proofs that n satisfies ‘Tarski’s truth
conditions’. Writing Bool(Φ) for the class of Boolean combinations of Φ-formulae, we have:
Proposition 27 (Properties of n, see e.g. [HP93]). For n ≥ 0, the following Πn+1 formulae
have IΣn+1 proofs of size polynomial in n:
(1) ∀ϕ ∈ Bool(Σn).∀ρ. (N, ρ n ¬ϕ ≡ N, ρ 2n ϕ).
(2) ∀ϕ,ψ ∈ Bool(Σn).∀ρ. (N, ρ n (ϕ ∨ ψ) ≡ (N, ρ n ϕ ∨ N, ρ  ψ)).
(3) ∀ϕ,ψ ∈ Bool(Σn).∀ρ. (N, ρ n (ϕ ∧ ψ) ≡ (N, ρ n ϕ ∧ N, ρ  ψ)).
(4) ∀ϕ ∈ Σn.∀ρ. (N, ρ n ∃x.ϕ ≡ ∃y.(N, ρ ∪ {x 7→ y} n ϕ)).
(5) ∀ϕ ∈ Πn.∀ρ. (N, ρ n ∀x.ϕ ≡ ∀y.(N, ρ ∪ {x 7→ y} n ϕ)).
We also have IΣn+1 proofs of size polynomial in n of the substitution property:
(6) ∀ϕ ∈ Bool(Σn).∀ρ.∀ terms t. (N, ρ ∪ {a 7→ ρ(t)} n ϕ ≡ N, ρ n ϕ[t/a]).
In particular we have the reflection property :
Proposition 28 (Reflection). For n ≥ 0 we have IΣ1 ⊢ ϕ ≡ (N,∅ n ϕ) with proofs of size
polynomial in n and |ϕ|, for any closed formula ϕ ∈ Σn ∪Πn.
Henceforth, all our proof complexity bounds in n follow from the fact that proofs are
parametrised by n and its basic properties from Prop. 27 above.
Definition 29 (Uniform description of an invalid branch). Let π be a CA preproof of a
sequent Γ ⇒ ∆, and let n ∈ N be such that all formulae occurring in π are Σn. Let ρ0
be an assignment such that N, ρ0 n
∧
Γ but N, ρ0 2n
∨
∆. The branch of π generated
by ρ0 is the invalid branch as constructed in the proof of Prop. 9, where at each step that
there is a choice of premiss the leftmost one is chosen, and at each step when there is a
choice of assignment of a natural number to a free variable the least one is chosen. We write
Branchn(π, ρ0, x, y) for the following predicate:
“the xth element of the branch generated by ρ0 in π is y”
To be precise, the ‘element’ y is given as a pair 〈ρx,Γx ⇒ ∆x〉 consisting of a sequent
Γx ⇒ ∆x and an assignment ρx that invalidates it.
Notice that Branchn(π, ρ0, x, y) is recursive w.r.t. the oracle n, and so is expressible by
a ∆1(n) formula, making it altogether ∆n+1 in its arguments. In fact, this is demonstrably
the case in IΣn+1, which can prove that Branchn(π, ρ0,−,−) is the graph of a function, as
shown in Prop. 30 below.
Let us write conc(π) for the conclusion of a CA proof π and, as in Sect. 3.2, Aπb and
Aπt for its branch and trace automata, resp. When we write N, ρ n (Γ⇒ ∆) we mean the
∆n+1 formula (N, ρ 2n
∧
Γ) ∨ (N, ρ n
∨
∆).
Proposition 30. For n ≥ 0, there are IΣn+1 proofs of size polynomial in n of:
∀π a CA preproof containing only Σn formulae.
∀ρ0. ((N, ρ0 2n conc(π)) ⊃ Branchn(π, ρ0,−,−) ∈ L(A
π
b ))
(6.4)
Proof. Working in IΣn+1, let π and ρ0 satisfy the hypotheses of (6.4) above. The fact that
Branchn(π, ρ0,−,−) is deterministic, cf. (5.4), follows directly by induction on the position
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of the branch. The difficult part is to show that Branchn(π, ρ0,−,−) is total, cf. (5.3),
i.e. that it never reaches a deadlock. For this we show,
∃〈ρx,Γx ⇒ ∆x〉. (Branchn(π, ρ0, x, 〈ρx,Γx ⇒ ∆x〉) ∧ N, ρx 2n (Γx ⇒ ∆x)) (6.5)
by Σn+1-induction on x. The base case, when x = 0, follows by assumption, so we proceed
with the inductive case. For a given x let 〈ρx,Γx ⇒ ∆x〉 witness (6.5) above and let r be
the rule instance in π that Γx ⇒ ∆x concludes.
If r is a ∃-r step with associated term t, then there is only one premiss which we show
remains false in the current assignment. This follows from:
N, ρ 2n ∃x.ϕ =⇒ N, ρ n ∀x.¬ϕ by Prop. 27.1
=⇒ ∀y.(N, ρ ∪ {x 7→ y} n ¬ϕ) by Prop. 27.5
=⇒ N, ρ ∪ {x 7→ ρ(t)} n ¬ϕ by pure logic
=⇒ N, ρ n ¬ϕ[t/x] by Prop. 27.6
=⇒ N, ρ 2n ϕ[t/x] by Prop. 27.1.
If r is a ∀-r step then there is only one premiss, for which we show that the appropriate
invalidating assignment exists. This follows from,
N, ρ 2n ∀x.ϕ =⇒ N, ρ n ∃x.¬ϕ by Prop. 27.1
=⇒ ∃y.(N, ρ ∪ {x 7→ y} n ¬ϕ) by Prop. 27.4
=⇒ ∃ least y.(N, ρ ∪ {x 7→ y} n ¬ϕ) by Σn+1-IND
=⇒ ∃ least y.(N, ρ ∪ {x 7→ y} 2n ϕ) by Prop. 27.1
where, in the penultimate implication, we rely on the fact that the appropriate ‘minimisation’
property is provable in Σn+1-IND (see, e.g., [Bus98]).
If r is a left quantifier step then it is treated similarly to the two right quantifier
cases above by De Morgan duality. If r is a propositional step then the treatment is simple,
following directly from Prop. 27. If r is an initial sequent we immediately hit a contradiction,
since all of the axioms are provably true in all assignments. If r is a substitution step, then
the existence of the appropriate assignment follows directly from the substitution property,
Prop. 27.6.
Finally, we may show that every state of the run of Branchn(π, ρ0,−,−) on A
π
b is final,
by Σn+1-induction, since it always correctly follows a branch of π. Thus we have that
Branchn(π, ρ0,−,−) ∈ L(A
π
b ).
Now we can give a formalised proof of the soundness of cyclic proofs:
Theorem 31 (Soundness of cyclic proofs, formalised). For n ≥ 0, there are IΣn+2 proofs
of size polynomial in n of:
∀π a CA preproof containing only Σn formulae.
(Aπb ⊑ A
π
t ⊃ ∀ρ0. N, ρ0 n conc(π))
(6.6)
Proof. First, instantiating X in Cor. 26 with a ∆n+1 formula ϕn yields O(|ϕn|)-size IΣn+2
proofs of (6.3)[ϕn/X]. Hence, setting ϕn to be Branchn(π, ρ0,−,−) and appealing to
Prop. 30 above, we arrive at IΣn+2 proofs of size polynomial in n of:
∀π a CA preproof containing only Σn formulae.
Aπb ⊑ A
π
t ⊃ ∀ρ0.(N, ρ0 2n conc(π) ⊃ ArAcc(Branchn(π, ρ0,−,−),A
π
t ))
(6.7)
Now, working in IΣn+2, to prove (6.6) let π satisfy A
π
b ⊑ A
π
t . For contradiction assume,
for some ρ0, that N, ρ0 2n conc(π). By Prop. 30 we have Branchn(π, ρ0,−,−) ∈ L(A
π
b ), so
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we henceforth write Γx ⇒ ∆x and ρx for the sequent and assignment at the x
th position
of Branchn(π, ρ0,−,−). By (6.7) above we have ArAcc(Branchn(π, ρ0,−,−),A
π
t ), so let x
witness its outer existential, cf. (6.1). Now, let y be the maximum value of ρx(t) for all
terms t occurring in Γx ⇒ ∆x. Again by ArAcc(Branchn(π, ρ0,−,−),A
π
t ), we have that
there is some (finite) trace z beginning from Γx ⇒ ∆x that progresses y+1 times. Writing
z(i) to denote the ith term in the trace z, we may show by induction on i ≤ |z|7 that, if there
are j progress points between z(0) and z(i), then we have that ρx(z(0)) ≥ ρx+i(z(i)) + j.
In particular, y ≥ ρx(z(0)) ≥ ρx+|z|(z(|z|)) + (y + 1) ≥ y + 1, yielding a contradiction.
6.3. PA exponentially simulates CA. We can now give our main proof complexity result:
Theorem 32. If π is a CA proof of ϕ, then we can construct a PA proof of ϕ of size
exponential in |π|.
Proof. Take the least n ∈ N such that π contains only Σn formulae; in particular n ≤ |π|.
Since π is a correct cyclic proof, there is a PA proof of Aπb ⊑ A
π
t , by exhaustive search. In
fact, such a proof in Q may be constructed in exponential time in |π|, thanks to Obs. 21
and Σ1-completeness of Q (see, e.g., [HP93]). Hence, by instantiating π in Thm. 31, we
have IΣn+2 proofs of N,∅ n ϕ of size exponential in |π|. Finally by the reflection property,
Prop. 28, we have that IΣn+2 ⊢ ϕ with proofs of size exponential in |π|.
Notice that we already have the converse polynomial simulation of PA in CA by the
results of [Sim17] or, alternatively, by Prop. 12.
7. IΣn+1 contains CΣn
In fact the proof method we developed in the last section allows us to recover a result on
logical complexity too. By tracking precisely all the bounds therein, we obtain that CΣn is
contained in IΣn+2, which is already an improvement to Simpson’s result (see Sect. 10 for
a comparison). To derive such bounds, in this section we concern ourselves only with cyclic
proofs containing Σn formulae. The universal closures of the conclusions of such proofs
axiomatise CΣn, cf. Dfn. 10, so more complex theorems of CΣn are thence derivable by
pure logic.
In fact, we may actually improve this logical bound and arrive at an optimal result
(given Thm. 15). By more carefully analysing the proof methods of [KMPM16], namely an
inspection of the proofs of Thms. 5 and 12 in that work, we have that:
Proposition 33 (Implicit in [KMPM16]). RCA0 ⊢ ∀X ∈ A
ω.(X ∈ L(Ac) ≡ X /∈ L(A)),
for any NBA A.
Notice here that the universal quantification over NBA is external, so that the complemen-
tation proofs are not necessarily uniform. This is not a trivial result, since it relies on a
version of Ramsey’s theorem, the additive Ramsey theorem, which can be proved by induc-
tion on the number of ‘colours’. Usual forms of Ramsey’s theorem are not proved by such
an argument, and in fact it is well known that RCA0 cannot even prove Ramsey’s theorem
for pairs with only two colours (see, e.g., [Hir14]). This allows us to ‘un-uniformise’ the
results of the previous section, using Prop. 33 above instead of Lemma 22.3, in order to
‘trade off’ proof complexity for logical complexity:
7Here we write |z| for the length of the trace z.
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Proposition 34 (Soundness of cyclic proofs, non-uniformly formalised). Let n ≥ 0 and π
be a CA proof containing only Σn formulae. IΣn+1 ⊢ ∀ρ0.(N, ρ0 n conc(π)).
Proof sketch. We mimic the entire argument of Thm. 31 by instantiating the fixed proof π
and using Prop. 33 above instead of Lemma 22.3. In particular, the required ‘non-uniform’
versions of Thm. 25 and Cor. 26 become derivable in RCA0 and IΣ1(X) resp., thus reducing
the global induction complexity by one level. Hence we arrive at a ‘non-uniform’ version
of Thm. 31, peculiar to the fixed proof π we began with, proved entirely within IΣn+1, as
required.
Theorem 35. For n ≥ 0, we have that CΣn ⊆ IΣn+1.
Proof. By the definition of CΣn, cf. Dfn. 10, it suffices to derive in IΣn+1 just the (possibly
open) conclusions of CΣn proofs containing only Σn formulae, and so the result follows
directly from Prop. 34 above.
7.1. On the proof complexity of CΣn. One might be tempted to conclude that the
elementary simulation of CA by PA should go through already for CΣn by IΣn+2 (indepen-
dently of n), due to the bounds implicit in the proof of Thm. 32. Furthermore, if we are
willing to give up a few more exponentials in complexity, one may even bound the size of IΣ1
proofs arising from Prop. 33 by an appropriate elementary function (though this analysis
is beyond the scope of this paper).
However, we must be conscious of the ‘robustness’ of the definition of CΣn proofs in
terms of complexity. The one we gave, which essentially requires cyclic proofs to contain
only Σn-formulae, is more similar to ‘free-cut free’ IΣn proofs than general ones, cf. Thm. 5,
so it seems unfair to compare these notions of IΣn and CΣn in terms of proof complexity.
In fact we may define a more natural notion of a CΣn proof from the point of view of
complexity, while inducing the same theory.
First, let us recall some notions from, e.g., [Bro06, BS11]. Any cyclic proof can be
written in ‘cycle normal form’, where any ‘backpointer’ (e.g., the conclusions of upper
sequents marked • until now) points only to a sequent that has occurred below it in the
proof. Referring to the terminology of [Bro06, BS11] etc., we say that a sequent is a bud in a
cyclic proof if it has a backpointer pointing to an identical sequent (called the companion).
Proposition 36. If ϕ has a CA proof whose buds and companions contain only Σn formulae
then CΣn ⊢ ϕ.
Proof idea. Once again, we simply apply free-cut elimination, Thm. 5, treating any back-
pointers as ‘initial sequents’ for a proof in cycle normal form.
This result again shows the robustness of the definition of CΣn as a theory, and we would
further argue that, from the point of view of proof complexity, the backpointer-condition
induced by Prop. 36 above constitutes a better notion of ‘proof’ for CΣn. At the same time
we see that it is not easy to compare the proof complexity of this notion of CΣn and IΣn+1,
due to the fact that we have used a free-cut elimination result for the simulations in both
directions, inducing a possibly non-elementary blowup in proof size. It would be interesting
if a more fine-grained result regarding the relative proof complexity of IΣn+1 and CΣn could
be established, but this is beyond the scope of the current work.
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8. Some metamathematical results
In this section we make some further observations on various properties of the cyclic theories
in this work. The exposition we give is brief, since we follow standard methods, but we
provide appropriate references for the reader.
8.1. Provably recursive functions of C∆0. As a corollary of the Thms. 15 and 35
we have that, for n ≥ 1, the provably recursive functions of CΣn (i.e. its Π2-theorems) are
precisely those of IΣn+1, which were characterised by Parsons in [Par72] as certain fragments
of Go¨del’s system T or, equivalently, by recursion up to suitably bounded towers of ω in
[Bus95]. This apparently leaves open a gap for the case of C∆0 (a.k.a. CΣ0). However,
recall that CΣn is defined as the theory axiomatised by the universal closures of cyclic
proofs containing only Σn formulae, so we have:
Observation 37. For n ≥ 0, CΣn is axiomatised by a set of Πn+1 sentences.
In particular C∆0 is Π1 axiomatised, meaning that it is a ‘bounded’ theory, in the sense of
Parikh [Par71]. Consequently, its provably recursive functions actually coincide with those
of I∆0:
Proposition 38. The provably recursive functions of C∆0 are just the functions in the
linear-time hierarchy.
To briefly explain the above result, Parikh’s theorem implies that, for any Π1-axiomatised
theory T over the language of arithmetic, if T ⊢ ∀x.∃y.ϕ, for ϕ ∈ ∆0, then in fact
T ⊢ ∀x.∃y < t.ϕ for some term t. (This may be proved simply via free-cut elimination,
Thm. 5.) This means we may simply search for a witness of linear size (in terms of the bit
string representation) verifying some predicate in the linear-time hierarchy, whence Prop. 38
above follows since the linear-time hierarchy is closed under bounded quantifiers.
See, e.g., [Bus98, CN10] for further discussions on the provably recursive functions of
fragments of (bounded) arithmetic, and see, e.g., [CK02] for more details on relationships
between the language of arithmetic and recursive function classes.
8.2. Failure of cut-admissibility. As a corollary of our results, we may formally conclude
that the cut rule is not admissible in CA, or indeed any of its fragments CΣn.
8 In fact the
situation is rather worse than that:
Corollary 39 (of Thms. 15 and 35). Let n ≥ 1. The class of CA proofs with only Σn−1
cuts is not complete for even the Π1 theorems of CΣn.
Proof. For a recursively axiomatised theory T , let Con(T ) be an appropriate Π1 sentence
expressing that “T does not prove 0 = 1”. It is well-known that IΣn+1 ⊢ Con(IΣn) (see, e.g.,
[Kay91, Bus98, HP93]), so also CΣn ⊢ Con(IΣn) by Thm. 15. For contradiction, suppose
Con(IΣn) concludes some CA proof with only Σn−1 cuts; then in fact CΣn−1 ⊢ Con(IΣn)
by degeneralising (for the case n = 1) and the subformula property. However this implies
IΣn ⊢ Con(IΣn) by Thm. 35, which is impossible by Go¨del’s second incompleteness theorem
for IΣn.
8This observation was pointed out to me by Stefano Berardi.
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See, e.g., [Bus98, Kay91, HP93] for further discussions on the provability of consistency
principles for fragments of arithmetic.
8.3. Reflection and consistency. Thanks to the uniformity of the results from Sect. 6,
we can give some fundamental metalogical properties regarding provable soundness and con-
sistency of cyclic proofs. First we will fix our formalisation of CΣn-provability (of arbitrary
sequents, not just Σn) in the language of arithmetic.
Let n ≥ 0. We will fix some appropriate formula Prfn(π, ϕ) expressing that π is a
CΣn proof of ϕ. We suppose that proofs are written as usual derivations (finite trees or
dags) whose leaves are either axiom instances from Q, or otherwise some (possibly open) Σn
sequent labelled by an associated cyclic proof that derives it (containing only Σn formulae).
Descriptively, Prfn(x, y) checks that π is a proof of ϕ by first checking that it is a well-
formed derivation, then checking that each premiss is either an axiom instance from Q or is
labelled by a correct cyclic proof deriving it. In the latter case it must search for a certificate
verifying that the cyclic proof satisfies the automaton-inclusion condition, i.e. that Ab ⊑ At.
While Prfn(π, ϕ) is recursive in π and ϕ, this may not be provably the case in weak
theories such as I∆0. Thus we fix Prfn to be an appropriate Σ1 formula, as described above,
and we write nϕ for ∃π.Prfn(π, ϕ). We write Πk-Rfn(CΣn) for the (local) Πk-reflection
principle of CΣn. I.e.
Πk-Rfn(CΣn) := {nϕ ⊃ ϕ : ϕ ∈ Πk}
Corollary 40 (of Thm. 31). For n ≥ 0, we have IΣn+2 ⊢ Πn+1-Rfn(CΣn).
Proof. Let ϕ(~x) be a Σn formula. Working in IΣn+2, suppose that n∀~x.ϕ (so that CΣn ⊢
∀~x.ϕ(~x)). We may assume that every formula occurring in a CΣn proof of the sequent
⇒ ϕ(~x) is Σn, thanks to free-cut elimination, Thm. 5 (recall that this result is provable
already in IΣ1). Thus we have N,∅ n+1 ∀~x.ϕ(~x) by Thm. 31 and Prop. 27.5, whence the
result follows by the reflection property, Prop. 28.
Notice that, while the statement of Cor. 40 above is peculiar to the current formulation
of a CΣn proof, Prfn, it holds also under any other notion of proof that is provably equiv-
alent in IΣn+2. In particular, in Sect. 7.1 we discussed another notion of proof for CΣn
which, morally, allowed “free cuts” to occur inside cycles. Since the equivalence of the two
formulations, Prop. 36, is proved using only free-cut elimination and basic reasoning, all
formalisable in IΣ1, the version of Cor. 40 for that more liberal notion of a CΣn proof holds
too.
As usual, we may see Π1-reflection as just another formulation of ‘consistency’. Let us
write Con(CΣn) for the sentence ¬n0 = 1 (notice that this is a Π1 sentence).
Corollary 41 (of Thm. 31). For n ≥ 0, we have IΣn+2 ⊢ Con(CΣn)
Proof. Follows immediately from Cor. 40 above by substituting 0 = 1 for ϕ.
We will see in the next subsection that this result is, in fact, optimal with respect to logical
complexity.
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8.4. Incompleteness. Perhaps unsurprisingly, all the theories CΣn suffer from Go¨del’s
incompleteness theorems since, while CΣn is not obviously effectively axiomatisable, it does
have an effective proof system, arithmetically formalised by the aforementioned formula Prfn.
We explicitly give the incompleteness result for CΣn here for both self-contained interest
and since we rely on it in the next section. We will also use it to derive the optimality of
Cor. 41 with respect to logical complexity.
Proposition 42 (Hilbert-Bernays-Lo¨b conditions). For n ≥ 0 we have:
(nec) If CΣn ⊢ ϕ then I∆0 ⊢ nϕ.
(K) I∆0 ⊢ n(ϕ ⊃ ψ) ⊃ (nϕ ⊃ nψ).
(4) I∆0 ⊢ nϕ ⊃ nnϕ.
Proof sketch. For (nec), since nϕ is semi-recursive, if it is true then it is provable already
over Q by Σ1-completeness, so in particular I∆0 ⊢ nϕ whenever CΣn ⊢ ϕ. For (K) notice
that the combination of two proofs π1, π2 by the modus ponens rule has size O(|π1|+|π2|), so
its existence and correctness will be provable in I∆0, whose provably recursive functions are
just those of the linear-time hierarchy (see, e.g., [HP93]). Finally, (4) is routine: working
in I∆0, given a CΣn proof π of ϕ, we simply describe the natural (non-cyclic) proof of
Prfn(π, ϕ) that just evaluates the formula.
Finally, since the ‘diagonal lemma’ holds even in Q (see, e.g., [HP93]), we can prove
Go¨del’s second incompleteness result as usual, e.g. by formalising Lo¨b’s theorem. We omit
proof details since the argument is standard, but the interested reader is referred to the
encyclopedia entry [Ver17] for an overview of the proof.
Theorem 43 (Go¨del’s second incompleteness theorem, for cyclic theories). For n ≥ 0, as
long as CΣn is consistent (i.e. CΣn 0 0 = 1), we have CΣn 0 Con(CΣn).
Consequently we have that Cor. 41 is, in fact, optimal in terms of logical complexity:
Corollary 44. For n ≥ 0, we have IΣn+1 0 Con(CΣn).
Proof. Suppose otherwise. Then also CΣn ⊢ Con(CΣn) by Π1-conservativity, cf. Thm. 15,
which contradicts Go¨del’s second incompleteness above, Thm. 43.
Thus we have that Cor. 41 is, in fact, optimal. We will see in the next section that this has
a curious consequence for the reverse mathematics of results in ω-automaton theory.
9. On the logical strength of McNaughton’s theorem
In this section we show how the results of this work yield an unexpected corollary: certain
formulations of McNaugton’s theorem, that every NBA has an equivalent deterministic ‘par-
ity’ or ‘Muller’ automaton, are not provable in RCA0. The general question of the logical
strength of McNaughton’s theorem was notably left as open in the recent work [KMPM16].
Our result is non-uniform in the sense that unprovability holds for any explicit primitive
recursive determinisation construction. As far as we are aware this accounts for all known
proofs of McNaughton’s theorem, suggesting that it is unlikely to be provable at all, in its
usual uniform version, in RCA0. That said, we point out that McNaughton’s theorem itself
is arguably not so well-defined in the context of reverse mathematics, since it is not clear
in RCA0 that different versions of the theorem coincide, in particular with respect to the
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choice of (a) acceptance conditions (parity, Muller, etc.) and (b) formulation of the set of
states infinitely often hit during a run (negative, ∀, vs. positive, ∃).
Our argument is based on an alternative route to proving the soundness of CΣn. As-
suming that an appropriate version of McNaughton’s theorem is indeed provable in RCA0,
we are in fact able to formalise the soundness argument for CΣn already in IΣn+1. How-
ever, consequently we have that IΣn+1 proves the consistency of CΣn, and so CΣn proves
its own consistency by Π1-conservativity, cf. Thm. 15, which is absurd by Go¨del’s second
incompleteness theorem for CΣn, Thm. 43.
9.1. Deterministic parity automata and universality. Due to space considerations,
we only briefly present the details of parity automata. The reader is encouraged to consult,
e.g., [Tho97], for further details on automaton theory for ω-languages.
A (non-deterministic) Rabin or parity automaton (NRA) is a just a NBA where,
instead of a set of final states F , we have a function c : Q→ N, called a colouring. A word
is accepted by a NRA if it has a run in which the least colour of a state occurring infinitely
often is even. The notion of deterministic parity automaton (DRA) is analogous to that of
a DBA, i.e. requiring the transition relation to be deterministic and total.
Theorem 45 (McNaughton, [McN66]). For every NBA A, we can effectively construct a
DRA accepting the same language.
Actually, McNaughton gave this result for deterministicMuller automata rather than parity
automata. The equivalence of these two models is well-known though, as we previously
mentioned, it is not clear whether RCA0 can prove their equivalence. The fact that we use
parity automata here is arbitrary; we believe a similar exposition could be carried out for
Muller automata.
As for DBA, we may naturally express language acceptance for a DRAA = (A,Q, δ, q0, c)
by an arithmetical formula, i.e. without SO quantifiers. For our purposes, it will be useful
to take a ‘negative’ formulation of acceptance:
X ∈ L(A) := ∀q ∈ Q.
((
∀x.∃x′ > x. qX(x
′) = q
∧ ∃x.∀x′ > x. c(qX(x
′)) ≥ c(q)
)
⊃ “c(q) is even”
)
We write σ : q1
∗
→
δ
q2 if a word σ ∈ A
∗ determines a path along δ starting at q1 and
ending at q2. We write
+
→
δ
when the path is nonempty. A simple loop about a state q ∈ Q is
a nonempty path along δ beginning and ending at q that visits no intermediate state more
than once.
We write Univ(A) for a standard recursive procedure for testing universality of A: “for
every odd-coloured state q reachable from q0, any simple loop about q contains a state
coloured by an even number < c(q)”. More formally, writing σ′ ≤ σ if σ′ is a prefix of σ:
Univ(A) :=
∀q
∗
←
δ
q0. ∀σ : q
+
→
δ
q.(
“σ is a simple loop” ∧ “c(q) is odd”
⊃ ∃σ′ ≤ σ. ∃q′ ∈ Q. (σ′ : q
+
→
δ
q′ ∧ “c(q′) even” ∧ c(q′) < c(q))
)
Clearly this formula is provably ∆01 in RCA0. Furthermore:
Proposition 46. RCA0 ⊢ ∀ DRA A. (Univ(A) ≡ ∀X ∈ A
ω.X ∈ L(A)).
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Proof. Working in RCA0, let A = (A,Q, δ, q0, c) be a DRA. For the left-right implication,
suppose there is some X ∈ Aω such that X /∈ L(A). Thus we have some q ∈ Q such that
c(q) is odd and the following hold:
∀x.∃x′ > x. qX(x
′) = q (9.1)
∃x.∀x′ > x. c(qX(x
′)) ≥ c(q) (9.2)
Let x0 be a witness to (9.2), and let x0 < x1 < x2 such that qX(x1) = qX(x2) = q, by two
applications of (9.1). We will need the following intermediate (arithmetical) result,
If σ : q
+
→
δ
q, there is a subsequence σ′ of σ that is a simple loop on q.
which follows directly by induction on |σ|, eliminating intermediate loops at each inductive
step in the case of non-simplicity. Now we apply this result to the sequence (X(x))x2x=x1 to
obtain a simple loop about q; moreover since this will be a subsequence of (X(x))x2x=x1 , we
have that any even-coloured state occurring in it is coloured > c(q), since x0 witnesses (9.2)
and x0 < x1 < x2, so ¬Univ(A).
For the right-left implication, we proceed again by contraposition. Suppose ¬Univ(A),
and let σ : q0
∗
→
δ
q and τ : q
+
→
δ
q such that c(q) is odd, and τ is a simple loop containing no
states coloured < c(q). We may now set X = στω (which is easily defined by comprehension)
and show that X /∈ L(A). For this it suffices to show (9.1) and (9.2) above. For the former,
given x we set x′ = |σ| + m|τ | > x, for some sufficiently large m. For the latter, we set
x = |σ| as the witness to the outer existential, whence (9.2) follows by construction of τ .
9.2. Reducing soundness of C∆0 to a version of McNaughton’s theorem. Hence-
forth we write L(A) = L(B) as shorthand for ∀X.(X ∈ L(A) ≡ X ∈ L(B)), where A and B
may be any type of automaton thus far encountered with respect to their associated notions
of membership. Based on our ‘negative’ formulation of DRA acceptance, we define for a
(definable) function d:
McNaughton−d := ∀ NBA A.(“d(A) is a DRA” ∧ ∀X.(X ∈ L(A) ≡ X ∈ L(d(A))))
Assuming this is provable in RCA0 for some primitive recursive function d, we will
reproduce a version of Thm. 25 in IΣn+1. The idea is that, rather than expressing the fact
that L(A1) ⊆ L(A2) by saying “(A
c
1 ⊔A2)
c is empty”, as we did in Sects. 6 and 7, we may
rather express it as “Ac1 ⊔ A2 is universal”, relying on McNaughton
−
d and Prop. 46 above.
For a DBA A1 and a NBA A2 we define A1 ⊑d A2 as Univ(d(A
c
1 ⊔A2))). Let us write
(6.3d) for the equation (6.3) with ⊑ replaced by ⊑d, i.e.:
∀ DBA A1,∀ NBA A2. ((A1 ⊑d A2 ∧X ∈ L(A1)) ⊃ ArAcc(X,A2)) (6.3d)
We have the following analogue to Thm. 25:
Proposition 47. RCA0 +McNaughton
−
d ⊢ (6.3d).
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Proof. Mimicking the proof of Thm. 25, we work in RCA0 and suppose X ∈ L(A1) and
A1 ⊑d A2. We have:
Univ(d(Ac1 ⊔ A2)) since A1 ⊑d A2
=⇒ ∀Y ∈ Aω.Y ∈ L(Ac1 ⊔ A2) by Prop. 46 and McNaughton
−
d
=⇒ ∀Y ∈ Aω.(Y ∈ L(Ac1) ∨ Y ∈ L(A2)) by Lemma 22.2
=⇒ ∀Y ∈ Aω.(Y ∈ L(A1) ⊃ Y ∈ L(A2)) by Lemma 22.4
=⇒ X ∈ L(A2) since X ∈ L(A1)
=⇒ ArAcc(X,A2) by Prop. 24.
We may use this result to reconstruct the entire formalised soundness argument for CΣn
of Sect. 6 in IΣn+1 instead of IΣn+2, assuming McNaughton
−
d . In particular, using Prop. 47
above instead of Thm. 25, we may recover versions of Cor. 26, Thm. 31 and Cor. 40 for
IΣn+1 instead of IΣn+2, with respect to (6.3d) instead of (6.3). Formally, let Πk-Rfnd(CΣn)
denote the formulation of the Πk-reflection principle for CΣn induced by using ⊑d instead
of ⊑ throughout Sect. 8.3, with respect to the definitions of Prfn and n. Similarly, let
Cond(CΣn) be the induced consistency principle.
Proposition 48. For n ≥ 0, if RCA0 ⊢ McNaughton
−
d for some primitive recursive function
d, then IΣn+1 ⊢ Πn+1-Rfnd(CΣn), so in particular IΣn+1 ⊢ Cond(CΣn).
Proof sketch. The argument goes through just like that of Cors. 40 and 41 of Thm. 31,
except that we use Prop. 47 instead of Thm. 25. Appealing to the assumption that RCA0 ⊢
McNaughton−d , this version of the argument requires only Σ
0
1-IND instead of Σ
0
2-IND, thus
yielding IΣn+1 proofs overall once we substitute the appropriate formulae for X.
Theorem 49. RCA0 0 McNaughton
−
d , for any primitive recursive function d.
Proof sketch. The same argument as Cor. 44 holds for our revised notion of consistency;
in particular we have that IΣ1 0 Cond(C∆0). The result now follows immediately by the
contraposition of Prop. 48 above, for n = 0.
10. Conclusions and further remarks
In this work we developed the theory of cyclic arithmetic by studying the logical complexity
of its proofs. We showed that inductive and cyclic proofs of the same theorems require sim-
ilar logical complexity, and obtained tight quantifier complexity bounds in both directions.
We further showed that the proof complexity of the two frameworks differs only elementarily,
although it remains unclear how to properly measure proof complexity for the fragments
CΣn, even if the theory seems well-defined and robust. Many of these issues constitute
avenues for further work.
10.1. Comparison to the proofs of [BT17b] and [Sim17]. One reason for our improved
quantifier complexity compared to [Sim17], is that Simpson rather relies on Weak Ko¨nig’s
Lemma (WKL) to obtain an infinite branch. This, a priori, increases quantifier complexity of
the argument, sinceWKL is known to be unprovable in RCA0 even in the presence of Σ
0
2-IND;
in fact, it is incomparable to Σ02-IND (see, e.g., [KMPM16]). That said, we believe that the
‘bounded-width WKL’ (bwWKL) of [KMPM16] should suffice to carry out Simpson’s proof,
and this principle is provable already in RCA0+Σ
0
2-IND. Applying this strategy to his proof
yields only that CΣn ⊆ IΣn+3, since bwWKL is applied to a Π
0
n+1 set, though this should
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improve to a IΣn+2 bound by using the non-uniform version of NBA complementation
implicit in [KMPM16], cf. Prop. 33. We reiterate that the main improvement here is in
giving a uniform formulation of those results; not only does this lead to a better proof
complexity result, cf. Thm. 32, but we also recover a metamathematical account of the
theories CΣn, cf. 8.
Berardi and Tatsuta’s approach, [BT17b], is rather interesting since it is arguably more
‘structural’ in nature, relying on proof-level manipulations rather than reflection principles.
That said there are still crucial sources of nonconstructivity, namely in an ‘arithmetical’
version of Ramsey’s theorem (Thm. 5.2) and the consequent Podelski-Rybalchenko termi-
nation theorem (Thm. 6.1). Both of these increase quantifier complexity by several levels,
and so their approach does not seem to yield comparable logical bounds to this work. Since
proof complexity is not a primary consideration of their work, it is not simple to track
the precise bounds in [BT17b]. There are some apparent sources of exponential blowups,9
though it seems that the global simulation is elementary. As before, we reiterate that the
major improvement in the present work is in the uniformity of our exposition: the approach
of [BT17b] is fundamentally non-uniform so does not yield any metamathematical account
of cyclic arithmetic.
10.2. On the correctness criteria for cyclic proofs. Since the algorithms used to check
correctness of a cyclic preproof reduce to the inclusion of Bu¨chi automata, the exponential
simulation of CA by PA is optimal, unless there is a nondeterministic subexponential-time
algorithm for PSPACE or, more interestingly, there is an easier way to check cyclic proof
correctness. (In fact, technically, it would suffice to have an easier criterion for a larger
class of preproofs that were, nonetheless, sound.) As far as we know, PSPACE remains
the best known upper bound for checking the correctness of general cyclic preproofs, al-
though efficient algorithms have recently been proposed for less general correctness criteria,
cf. [Str17, NST18]. Thus, it would be interesting to prove a corresponding lower bound or
otherwise improve the upper bound. Conditional such results could be obtained via, say,
certain polynomial upper bounds on proof complexity in CA: for instance, if CA were to have
polynomial-size proofs of each correct Bu¨chi inclusion then cyclic proof correctness would
not be polynomial-time checkable, unless NP = PSPACE. Unfortunately na¨ıve attempts
at this approach fail, but the general question of whether PA and CA are exponentially
separated seems pertinent.
On the other hand, the translation of Lemma 16 from inductive proofs to cyclic proofs
is rather structured. In light of the converse result in Sect. 6 it might make sense in further
work, from the point of view of logical complexity, to consider only cyclic proofs accepted
by some weaker more efficiently verified criterion, such as [Str17, NST18].
10.3. Interpreting ordinary inductive definitions in arithmetic. In earlier work by
Brotherston and Simpson, cyclic proofs were rather considered over a system of FO logic
extended by ‘ordinary’ Martin-Lo¨f inductive definitions [ML71], known as FOLID [Bro06,
BS07, BS11]. Berardi and Tatsuta showed in [BT17b] that the cyclic system CLKIDω for
FOLID is equivalent to the inductive system LKID, when at least arithmetic is present,
somewhat generalising Simpson’s result [Sim17]. We point out that ordinary Martin-Lo¨f
9For instance, Lemma 8.4 in that work yields a set of apparently exponential size in the worst case, and
this bounds from below the size of the overall translation, e.g. as in Lemma 8.7.
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inductive definitions can be interpreted in arithmetic in the usual way by a Σ1 inductive
construction of ‘approximants’, and a proof of CLKIDω may be similarly interpreted line-
by-line in CA. (This is similar to the role of the ‘stage number predicates’ in [BT17b].) In
particular, this means that CLKIDω(+PA) is conservative over CA. We reiterate that the
interest behind the results of [BT17b] is rather the structural nature of the transformations,
but this observation also exemplifies why CA is a natural and canonical object of study, as
argued in [Sim17].
10.4. Cyclic propositional proof complexity. One perspective gained from this work
comes in the setting of propositional proof complexity (see, e.g., [CN10, Kra95]). Thm. 15
of Sect. 4 should relativise to theories with oracles too. For instance, we may formalise in
C∆0(f), where f is a fresh (uninterpreted) function symbol, a proof of the relativised version
of the (finitary) pigeonhole principle (see App. A). This formula is known to be unprovable
in I∆0(f) due to lower bounds on propositional proofs of bounded depth [KPW95, PBI93].
At the same time the ‘Paris-Wilkie’ translation [PW81], which fundamentally links
I∆0(f) to bounded-depth proofs, works locally on a proof, at the level of formulae. Conse-
quently one may still apply the translation to the lines of a C∆0(f) proof to obtain small
‘proof-like’ objects containing only formulae of bounded depth, and a cyclic proof structure.
One would expect that this corresponds to some strong form of ‘extension’, since it is known
that adding usual extension to bounded systems already yields full ‘extended Frege’ proofs.
However at the same time, some of this power has been devolved to the proof structure
rather than simply at the level of the formula, and so could yield insights into how to prove
simulations between fragments of Hilbert-Frege systems with extension.
We point out that recent work, [AL18], relating cyclic proof structures to proof com-
plexity has already appeared, albeit with a different correctness criterion.
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Appendix A. Case study: the relativised pigeonhole principle
In this section we will give an example of the translation from Sect. 4 in a relativised setting.
Simpson already gave an example of a separation between CΣ1 and IΣ2 via the totality of
the Ackermann-Pe´ter function [Sim17], a Π2 sentence. Logically simpler Π1 separations are
obtainable in the form of consistency principles, as we discussed in Sect. 8.
In this section we consider the well-known pigeonhole principle, defined by the following
FO formula with an uninterpreted function symbol f :
PHP(f) := ∀n.(∀x ≤ n.f(x) < n ⊃ ∃x ≤ n.∃x′ < x.f(x) = f(x′))
It is well-known that I∆0(f) does not prove PHP(f), due to lower bounds on propositional
proofs of bounded depth [KPW95, PBI93]. On the other hand, by relativising the construc-
tions in Sect. 4, it is provable in C∆0(f) thanks to the known simple proofs in IΣ1(f).
A.1. A simple proof of PHP(f) in IΣ1(f). First we recall a simple well-known proof of
PHP(f) in IΣ1(X). In fact, as in Sect. 4, we will work with Π1-IND rather than Σ1-IND.
Temporarily, let us write A,B for first-order variables that we interpret as the codes
of finite sets. For such codes we may use set-theoretic symbols such as ∈ and \ with their
usual interpretations, with the understanding that their basic properties are provable in
I∆0.
Lemma 50. IΣ1(f) proves the following:
∀A,B.(|A| > |B| ⊃ (∀x ∈ A.f(x) ∈ B ⊃ ∃x, x′ ∈ A.(x 6= x′ ∧ f(x) = f(x′)))) (A.1)
Proof. Working in IΣ1(f), we reason by induction on |B|. If B is empty and |A| > |B| then
A is nonempty and so (A.1) is vacuously true by falsity of the premiss.
Otherwise B is nonempty, so let b ∈ B and let |A| > |B|.
• If ∃x ∈ A.f(x) = b then, let a ∈ A such that f(a) = b.
– If ∃x ∈ A.(x′ 6= a ∧ f(x′) = b) then we are done.
– Otherwise suppose ∀x ∈ A.(f(x) = b ⊃ x = a). Then we have ∀x ∈ A \ {a}.f(x) ∈
B \ {b}. Since we still have that |A \ {a}| > |B \ {b} we may conclude by the inductive
hypothesis.
• Otherwise ∀x ∈ A.f(x) 6= b, so in fact ∀x ∈ A.f(x) ∈ B \ {b} and still |A| > |B \ {b}.
Hence we conclude by the inductive hypothesis.
From here there is a simple proof of (A.1) ⊃ PHP(f) in I∆0(f), by instantiating A and
B as [0, n] and [0, n) resp. Thus we have that IΣ1(f) ⊢ PHP(f).
A.2. A proof of PHP(f) in C∆0(f). To show that C∆0(f) ⊢ PHP(f) it suffices to give
C∆0(f) proofs of Lemma 50. The remainder of the argument may be carried out in I∆0(f),
and so also in C∆0(f) by Prop. 12,
Lemma 51. C∆0(f) ⊢ (A.1).
Proof. As abbreviations, let us write f(A) ⊆ B for ∀x ∈ A.f(x) ∈ B and Injf (A) for
∀x, x′ ∈ A.(f(x) = f(x′) ⊃ x = x′). We give an appropriate derivation in Fig. 2, mimicking
the argument of Lemma 50 under Lemma 16, where π0 is a I∆0(f) proof of B = ∅, |A| >
|B|, f(A) ⊆ B ⇒ ¬Injf (A) and π1 is a proof of a
′ ∈ A, a′ 6= a, f(a′) = b, a ∈ A, f(a) = b, b ∈
B, |A| > |B|, f(A) ⊆ B ⇒ ¬Injf (A).
34 A. DAS
pi0
.
.
.
•
|A| > |B|, f(A) ⊆ B ⇒ ¬Injf (A)
sub
|A \ {a}| > |B \ {b}|, f(A \ {a}) ⊆ B \ {b} ⇒ ¬Injf (A \ {a})
∀x ∈ A.(f(x) = b ⊃ x = a), a ∈ A, f(a) = b, b ∈ B, |A| > |B|, f(A) ⊆ B ⇒ ¬Injf (A) pi1
a ∈ A, f(a) = b, b ∈ B, |A| > |B|, f(A) ⊆ B ⇒ ¬Injf (A)
.
.
.
•
|A| > |B|, f(A) ⊆ B ⇒ ¬Injf (A)
sub
|A| > |B \ {b}|, f(A) ⊆ B \ {b} ⇒ ¬Injf (A)
∀x ∈ A.¬f(x) = b, b ∈ B, |A| > |B|, f(A) ⊆ B ⇒ ¬Injf (A)
b ∈ B, |A| > |B|, f(A) ⊆ B ⇒ ¬Injf (A)
•
|A| > |B|, f(A) ⊆ B ⇒ ¬Injf (A)
⊃,∀
⇒ ∀A,B.(|A| > |B| ⊃ (f(A) ⊆ B ⊃ ¬Injf (A)))
Figure 2: A C∆0(f) proof of PHP(f), where π0 is a I∆0(f) proof of B = ∅, |A| >
|B|, f(A) ⊆ B ⇒ ¬Injf (A) and π1 is a proof of a
′ ∈ A, a′ 6= a, f(a′) = b, a ∈
A, f(a) = b, b ∈ B, |A| > |B|, f(A) ⊆ B ⇒ ¬Injf (A).
